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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

18 MARCH 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

18 March 1970
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FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

Highlights 1
Paris Talks: 12 March Session 2
Son My Anniversary, Protests Against U.S. "Crimes" 3
Solidarity Week, Antidraft Week, 19 March Anniversary 4
VFA General Political Department Conference 5
DRV Youth Groups Renamed After Ho Chi Minh 5

CAMBODIA

Soviet Media Publicize Sihanouk Talks in Moscow 7
DRV, PRG Blame "Rightists" for Attack on Embassies 8
NCNA Statement Denies Cambodia Embassy Attacked 11

LAOS

Kosygin Rejects President's Call for Geneva Consultations 12
Hanoi Continues Praise for NLHX Program, Criticism of Nixon 13
Pathet Lao Scores U.S. Demand for DRV Troop Withdrawal 15
Peking Scores Alleged U.S. Combat Presence in Laos 15

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Defends Position of Soviet Jews, Assails Zionism 17
USSR Speculates on Phantom Decision, U.S. Military Involvement 19

STRATEGIC ARMS

Soviet Press Sustains Attack on U.S. Stand on Arms, SALT 21

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

TASS Statement Denies Soviets Preparing Attack on China 23

USSR AND EAST EUROPE

Moscow Assails "Selfish" Nationalism, Calls for Integration 26
Soviet Maneuvers Imply Warning to Dissident Communist States 27

WEST GERMANY

GDR Demands Brandt State Views on Draft Treaty at Erfurt 30

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 9 - 15 MARCH 1970

Moscow (3812 items)

China	(5%)	9.5%
[TASS Statement	(--)	4%]
Middle East	(14%)	9%
[Zionism and	(2%)	5%]
Soviet Jews		
Indochina	(5%)	8%
[Laos	(1%)	4%]
[Vietnam	(3%)	4%]
[Cambodia	(--)	0.1%]
Soviet Military	(--)	6%
Maneuvers		
Makarios Assassination	(--)	3%
Attempt		

Peking (3034 items)

Domestic Issues	(50%)	47%
Indochina	(6%)	7%
[Laos	(6%)	7%]
[Vietnam	(--)	--]
[Cambodia	(--)	--]
Kuo Mo-Jo's Tour	(0.3%)	7%
[Nepal	(0.3%)	4%]
[Pakistan	(--)	3%]
Middle East	(4%)	6%
U.S.-Soviet Cultural	(0.1%)	3%
Agreement		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 1 -

VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

HIGHLIGHTS

PARIS TALKS: VNA's account of the 58th session of the Paris talks on 12 March features DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's discourse on the stock theme that U.S. actions in Vietnam and Laos contradict U.S. professions of a desire to settle the Vietnam conflict peacefully. A standard attack on the Saigon government was made by PRG representative Nguyen Van Tien, who had last substituted for delegation head Mme. Binh at the 44th session. VNA does not mention that both delegates denounced previous U.S. suggestions for private talks.

DOWNED U.S. DRONES: VNA claims on the 14th that a U.S. reconnaissance drone was downed that day over Haiphong and alleges on the 17th that another was downed over Nghe An Province, bringing Hanoi's total of U.S. planes downed over the North to 3,335. Seven planes have been claimed by Hanoi this year; the last previous alleged downing was on 17 February.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Liberation Radio on the 17th takes note of the 14 March terrorist attack in Saigon, claiming that extensive damage was done in a bomb attack on an administrative building in the third precinct. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 14th praises efforts to destroy allied tanks and armored vehicles and says the resulting allied losses deal "heavy blows" at Vietnamization.

U.S. "CRIMES": Vietnamese communist comment on the anniversary of the 16 March 1968 Son My "massacre" includes a 12 March southern War Crimes Commission statement, which charges that the incident at Son My was not an isolated one, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th which refers to the Son My anniversary as "International Day Against U.S. Imperialist Crimes." Alleged U.S. crimes in the North and South in the first half of March are reviewed in a crime commission communique carried by VNA on the 18th.

MOSCOW PROPAGANDA: Soviet propaganda supports the "Day Against U.S. Crimes." A 16 March commentary in Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress uses the occasion to score China for refusing to participate in a united front against U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam and to charge that Peking hopes the war will not end.

NORTH VIETNAM: According to a 7 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report, the VPA General Political Department "recently" held a conference which reviewed policies and noted problems in their implementation. On 11 March VNA carries a VWP Central Committee resolution renaming DRV youth organizations after Ho Chi Minh.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 2 -

PARIS TALKS: 12 MARCH SESSION

PRG ATTACK ON THE GVN PRG representative Nguyen Van Tien,* who last headed the PRG delegation to the meetings on 28 November 1969, devoted his statement at the 58th session to a discussion of President Nixon's consistent position that the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is not negotiable. Viewing this position as representative of the "obdurate" American attitude and as part of an Administration effort to deceive public opinion, Tien asked rhetorically whether the existence of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration is consistent with the right of self-determination. In response, he launched into a stock diatribe on the nature and actions of the "puppet" regime, including "cases of repression and persecution within the Saigon administration itself."

Tien routinely contended that American persistence in maintaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam and in supporting the "puppet administration" has impeded the progress of the Paris conference. He scored the United States not only for "evading its responsibility" to "renounce" the Saigon administration but also for "resorting to maneuvers in an attempt to legalize it--for instance, to allow it to hold 'private talks' and organize the so-called 'free elections.'" Neither the VNA nor the LPA account of the session mentions this statement.

DRV CRITICISM OF U.S. POSITION The VNA account of the session indicates that DRV representative Nguyen Minh Vy continued to develop the standard theme that the Nixon Administration's recent actions do not match its professions of a desire to settle the Vietnam conflict peacefully. He coupled a standard attack on Vietnamization with the claim that "many people in U.S. political circles" also say the Vietnamization policy is aimed at prolonging the war. VNA does not report that Vy specifically cited the views expressed by Senator Muskie in his 5 March speech at the National Press Club.

VNA notes Vy's charge that the Nixon Administration considers the Paris negotiations to be secondary to its policy of Vietnamization and that it maintains a delegation at the conference "for the mere sake of form." VNA does not report that Vy went on to score the U.S. delegation for having at "recent" sessions "sought to elude the fundamental questions we raised and advanced proposals on private meetings, restricted meetings, discussion of specific questions,

* VNA on 16 March and LPA on the 17th carry accounts of the departure of PRG delegation head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh from Paris for a visit to Algeria. She was seen off by Nguyen Van Tien and DRV delegation member Nguyen Minh Vy, among others, according to VNA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 3 -

etc.** The VNA account records Vy's routine accusations that the Nixon Administration does not really want to settle the war peacefully and instead has intensified the war in South Vietnam, stepped up "acts of war" against the DRV, escalated the war in Laos, and downgraded the Paris talks "so as subsequently to sabotage" the conference. Vy's review of statistics on alleged U.S. activities against the North in February--including the number of reconnaissance missions, bombing raids, B-52 strikes, and shellings of the northern part of the DMZ--repeats charges contained in the DRV War Crimes Commission communique released on 4 March.

ALLIED SPEECHES True to form, VNA brushes off the remarks of the U.S. and GVN delegates, saying they "shed more light on the adamant position of the United States and its henchmen." It notes that GVN representative Nguyen Xuan Phong--substituting for chief GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam, who is visiting some West European capitals--"prattled about the so-called 'free elections' and 'respect for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination' raised by traitor Nguyen Van Thieu."

VNA says that Ambassador Habib** again took up the POW problem while "eluding the fundamental problems" contained in the NFLSV-PRG 10-point solution. It does not mention that Ambassador Habib did not deliver any formal prepared statement.

SON MY ANNIVERSARY, PROTESTS AGAINST U.S. "CRIMES"

Front attention to the 16 March anniversary of the 1968 Son My massacre is highlighted by a War Crimes Commission communique dated 12 March and broadcast that day by Liberation Radio. The communique claims that the Son My incident was not an isolated one and describes

* It is not clear what sessions Vy was referring to. At the 8 and 15 January sessions the U.S. delegation formally repeated its bid for private restricted meetings. Communist media predictably ignored the post-session press briefing by U.S. delegation spokesman Ledogar on 12 March at which he commented that there is a standing, open invitation for the communist side to engage in private meetings and that the original proposals in this regard made by the delegation last September still stand, but that the proposals were being repeated at the 12 March session.

** VNA's English-language report on the session identifies Ambassador Habib as "deputy head" of the delegation; but this seems to be a VNA translation error, since VNA reports in French and Vietnamese follow the usual practice of identifying him as "acting" delegation head.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 4 -

"new massacres" in the South, including "crimes" in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam in October and November 1969 which have been previously denounced in propaganda. As usual the communique alleges that "massacres" have become more numerous and systematic since President Nixon came to power. It further asserts that "at the behest of the White House and Pentagon" the allies have resorted to "unprecedented war maneuvers to completely destroy large areas," and it concludes that the people will punish the allies for their crimes.

A NHAN DAN editorial on 16 March states that the Vietnamese people and "world public opinion" are denouncing U.S. "crimes" on the occasion of the 16 March International Day Against the U.S. Imperialists' Crimes in South Vietnam. The editorial, summarized by VNA, charges that the allies are effecting Vietnamization by resorting to "barbarous war maneuvers." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 16th, broadcast that day by Hanoi, concentrates on the Son My incident, echoing other propaganda and labeling the Johnson and Nixon "cliques" the "cruellest war criminals in history."

A communique from the War Crimes Commission released by VNA on 18 March rounds up U.S. "crimes" during the first half of March. In enumerating alleged crimes in the South, the communique routinely mentions U.S. bombing but also attacks Vietnamization and cites Senator Muskie's comments on 5 March at the National Press Club that the President's Vietnamization policy can only be a formula for perpetuating the war. The communique also attacks the Saigon administration for its action against news publications in the South and states that on 14 March Ambassador Harriman, "former U.S. chief negotiator" at the Paris talks, "criticized the arrest and prosecution of Tran Ngoc Chau as an obvious attempt to silence all South Vietnamese who want peace through a negotiated settlement." (The quotation is taken from the statement of the Democratic Party's National Committee, which was made public by Harriman, responding to the President's 18 February Foreign policy report.)

SOLIDARITY WEEK, ANTIDRAFT WEEK, 19 MARCH ANNIVERSARY

Hanoi and Front media round up examples of foreign support occasioned by the 20th anniversary of National Anti-U.S. Day on 19 March and the 13-19 March week of solidarity with the Vietnamese people, as well as the 16 March day against U.S. "crimes." A few news reports also note activities in the United States in connection with the current anti-draft week, and Hanoi publicizes messages from various DRV organizations to peace groups in the United States to mark the antidraft week. A 14 March message from the Vietnam Solidarity Committee With the American People, addressed to the New Mobilization Committee, declares that "along with your antirepressions counteroffensive, your antitax day and other activities in your spring offensive, your antidraft

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 5 -

actions this time show the ever more strengthened determination of the American people in their struggle for an immediate end to the war"

Only scattered propaganda items are available so far on the 19 March anniversary of the 1950 Saigon uprising. On the 17th Liberation Radio broadcasts a letter from Nguyen Huu Tho to the people of Saigon commemorating the anniversary. The radio reports that the letter was read by Tho, who had not been reported to have appeared in public since November 1969 and thus missed the activities marking the NFLSV anniversary in December. A belated report on a 12 February meeting marking the PLAF anniversary--contained in a 16 March Liberation Radio broadcast of a 25 February QUAN GIAI PHONG article--indicates that Tho did not attend that meeting. He last attended a PLAF anniversary meeting in 1966.

VPA GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CONFERENCE

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reports on 7 March that the VPA General Political Department convened a conference "recently" to review the implementation of 1969 policies and "propagate the goals and contents of 1970 policies." Maj. Gen. Le Quang Dao, deputy director of the General Political Department, and Le Dinh Thiep, vice minister of interior, attended the meeting. The paper reports that the implementation of policies toward families of heroes and combat troops has made "great progress." Without spelling out the nature of the problems, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN report evinces concern over failure "to carefully comply with regulations and to continue studying the proposals on the determination, improvement, and amendment of a number of policies."

DRV YOUTH GROUPS RENAMED AFTER HO CHI MINH

VNA on 11 March carries the text of a resolution issued by the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee renaming the Vietnam Working Youth Union, the Vietnam Young Pioneers Organization, and the Vietnam Children's Organization after President Ho. The resolution indicates that the action was sparked by a proposal from the Vietnam Working Youth Union. The resolution routinely lauds Ho's attention to youth and his stress on the importance of their education. It calls the bearing of "Uncle Ho's" name "a very great honor and responsibility of the younger generations," and it calls on the youth to follow Ho's example. It also calls on committees of the party, administration, trade unions, and other groups to fulfill their responsibility for training "revolutionary generations for the future."

The name change prompts a flurry of propaganda echoing the resolution and expressing the determination of young people to carry out their

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 6 -

tasks. Hanoi radio and VNA, on the 11th and 12th respectively, report a "recent" enlarged conference of the Working Youth Union Central Committee addressed by Vu Quang, first secretary of the youth group. The accounts note that the conference adopted a letter from the group's central committee to the VWP Central Committee, a letter to the Young Pioneers and children, and an appeal to cadres and members of the Youth Union. In addition, VNA on the 12th reports the publication of a special issue of the party paper NHAN DAN greeting the name changes and notes editorial comment in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the youth paper TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 7 -

CAMBODIA

SOVIET MEDIA PUBLICIZE SIHANOUK TALKS IN MOSCOW

The Cambodian National Assembly vote to remove Sihanouk from his post as Chief of State, announced by Phnom Penh Radio on 18 March, has not been mentioned in communist media as of this writing. The reported move took place while Sihanouk was in Moscow, on his way home from Paris in the wake of 11 March incidents in Phnom Penh in which Cambodian demonstrators ransacked the DRV and PRG embassies to protest Vietnamese "aggression" against their country.

Sihanouk arrived in Moscow on 13 March and had talks with Podgornyy and Kosygin and met Brezhnev on the 17th for talks which TASS characterized as "warm and friendly." A TASS English report of Sihanouk's talks with Podgornyy and Kosygin on the 14th does not indicate their substance, merely noting that the leaders "discussed questions of further development of relations between the Soviet Union and Cambodia" and "exchanged opinions on a number of international problems." The conversation, TASS says, took place in an "atmosphere of sincerity and friendship." The Moscow domestic service version describes the atmosphere as being one of "frankness and friendship."*

A similar TASS report of talks on the 16th adds that the sides noted that the "aggression of American imperialists in Vietnam, armed U.S. intervention in Laos, provocations of American and Saigon troops against Cambodia and violation of her neutrality were the main reasons for the aggravation of the situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole." A Budapest MTI version of the report adds--in a passage not carried by TASS--that the sides expressed the conviction that if the United States ceased aggression in Vietnam and intervention in Laos and desisted from provocations toward Cambodia, and if "all states" respected Cambodia's neutrality and territorial inviolability, "this would result in a restoration of peace in Indochina and would improve the atmosphere in Southeast Asia as a whole."

The TASS report on the 16 March talks notes that the Soviet Government confirmed its respect for Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity and asserted that the USSR would continue to support Cambodia, "headed by her national leader Samdech Norodon Sihanouk," in its struggle against "imperialist" provocations and interference. (In a telegram to his

* There does not appear to be any special significance in the TASS English usage of "sincerity" where the Moscow domestic uses "frankness" (otkrovennost). The meaning of the usual Russian word for sincerity (iskrennost) is more or less synonymous with frankness (otkrovennost), the term more commonly used in Soviet communiques on visits.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

- 8 -

18 MARCH 1970

mother reported by AFP on 18 March, Sihanouk said the Soviet leaders told him that the policies of the Cambodian "right wing" were "extremely dangerous" and that they offered him "aid of many kinds" to restore order and neutrality in Cambodia--aid which Sihanouk turned down. He reportedly quoted Kosygin as warning that if the "extreme right" in Cambodia continues to deal "low blows" to the Vietnamese, there will inevitably be war between Cambodia and Vietnam.)

Sihanouk's departure from Moscow is reported by TASS on 18 March, the first report noting that he left "for home." Another TASS report some 25 minutes later changes this to read merely: Sihanouk "left here." Sihanouk has been scheduled to visit Peking after his stop in Moscow.* Both TASS reports note that Kosygin saw Sihanouk off at the airport.

DRV, PRG BLAME "RIGHTISTS" FOR ATTACK ON EMBASSIES

The 11 March attacks on the DRV and PRG embassies in Phnom Penh drew a relatively conciliatory propaganda response from the Vietnamese communists. Hanoi and PRG media promptly picked up Sihanouk's statements--including an 11 March telegram to his mother--placing blame on "rightwing elements" and the Americans. The Vietnamese communist media describe the incidents as inconsonant with Sihanouk's "line," thereby further absolving him of personal responsibility. The DRV and PRG charges d'affaires ad interim protested the incidents and demanded compensation, but called at the same time for a meeting to remove "problems" in relations with Cambodia. They did not specify that the "problems" included Cambodia's demand that the DRV and PRG withdraw their troops from Cambodian territory by the morning of 15 March. Followup Vietnamese communist propaganda, including three NHAN DAN Commentator articles, stresses the need to settle pending questions and strengthen the solidarity of the Indochinese countries against the "common enemy," the United States.

Moscow and Peking both carry reports of the initial DRV and PRG protests, Sihanouk's 11 March telegram to his mother, and the DRV and PRG proposals for a meeting with Cambodia. Moscow's reports are prompt, but Peking's first, belated acknowledgment comes in a 16 March NCNA "authorized" statement, followed by other NCNA reports.

* Peking has not so far mentioned Sihanouk's pending visit. Phnom Penh media on the 16th, but not Peking, reported an exchange of messages between Chou En-lai and Sihanouk in which Chou expressed pleasure at Sihanouk's acceptance of his invitation to visit Peking and Sihanouk expressed gratitude for Chinese arrangements for the forthcoming visit.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 9 -

11 MARCH Hanoi first acknowledged the sacking of the DRV and PRG
INCIDENTS embassies in a VNA report the following day which noted
that the respective charges d'affaires had met with
Cambodian Foreign Minister Phurissara to protest the actions. According
to VNA, they "stressed that these acts ran counter to the line" of
Prince Sihanouk, impaired Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship, contravened
international law, and "only benefited the U.S. aggressors." Liberation
Radio carried an identical report on the 13th.

On the 13th VNA reported the 11 March message from Sihanouk in Paris
to his mother, quoting his expression of "deep sadness" at the events
and his claim that the actions were organized by "individuals aiming
to destroy irreparably the friendship between Cambodia and the socialist
bloc, throwing our country into the arms of a capitalist, imperialist
power." VNA predictably omitted Sihanouk's expression of understanding
of "the motives which aroused our compatriots' anger."

Also on the 13th, VNA reported Sihanouk as declaring in his speech over
French TV that the "right" had used his long absence to try to "change
the political and ideological orientation of Cambodia" and force it
into the "American camp." VNA naturally ignored his announcement that
he would go to Moscow and Peking to ask them to tell the "Viet Minh" and
"Viet Cong" to leave Cambodia, and his warning that if they did not do
so Cambodia might "go over to the American camp."

A **NEAN DAN** Commentator article on 14 March stresses Vietnamese determina-
tion to defend solidarity with the Cambodians, blaming the embassy
sackings on "a number of saboteurs" who want to harm the friendship
of the two countries. The Commentator article cites Sihanouk's French
TV speech, noting his charges that there had "certainly been contacts
between the Americans and the Cambodian right wing" and that the United
States would like to "penetrate" Cambodia to change its politics and
ideology. The article accuses the United States of scheming to pit
the Indochinese people against each other in accordance with the "Nixon
doctrine" of "making Asians fight Asians." It praises Sihanouk for his
"clearsighted leadership" and resistance to U.S. "threats and encroachments,"
and it says the Vietnamese regard the Cambodians as their "comrades-in-arms
against the common enemy," U.S. imperialism. Liberation Radio, in
commentaries on the 13th and 14th, similarly stresses the need for
solidarity among the Indochinese peoples against the "common enemy."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 10 -

TRIPARTITE MEETING Hanoi and Liberation media did not report the RKG notes to the DRV and PRG, publicized in the Phnom Penh domestic service on 13 March, demanding that the two governments withdraw all their troops from Cambodian territory by the morning of 15 March. Instead, on the 14th, VNA reported that the DRV charge d'affaires called on the Cambodian Foreign Ministry and informed it of a DRV Government "proposal on a settlement of problems arising between the parties concerned." Without identifying the "problems," the proposal demanded that the RKG punish those responsible for the embassy incident and pay compensation, stressed the DRV's desire to maintain good-neighbor relations with Cambodia, and suggested that "to remove hindrances" to relations between the two countries, the parties concerned meet on 15 March or at any other time suitable to Cambodia. On the 15th, Liberation media carried a similar proposal made by the PRG charge d'affaires.

Both Hanoi and Liberation media followed up the proposal to hold talks with comment. A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 15th called for negotiations to settle pending questions in the interests of Vietnamese-Cambodian friendship. It said the "deep cause" of "complicated problems" in the relations between the two countries was "the aggression by the U.S. imperialists in South Vietnam and their schemes to abolish the independence and neutrality of Cambodia," and it urged that the two countries "unite" to fight "U.S. aggression." LPA commented in a similar vein on the 15th.

Another NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 16th, praising the agreement on the meeting, "welcomed" reports that Sihanouk's mother had "intervened firmly" to put an end to acts of violence against Vietnamese property in Phnom Penh. At the same time, expressing "regret" that "statements and articles in a number of Phnom Penh papers" had continued to generate "national enmity" and to present the Vietnamese "as the aggressor against Cambodia," the Commentator article called upon the Cambodian side to make efforts to create a "favorable atmosphere" for talks.

Cambodia's agreement to hold a meeting of the three governments on the 16th was promptly reported by Hanoi, but Moscow media so far carry the only available communist reports that the meeting actually took place. There is thus far no communist acknowledgment of the outcome of the talks, at which Western media say no progress was made.

The DRV acknowledges for the first time, and denies, reports of Cambodian-North Vietnamese military clashes in an 18 March VNA report of a Hanoi radio commentary. The commentary says that on 16 March AP carried a "cooked-up story" that "a battle had taken place between two Cambodian and North Vietnamese battalions for four hours" in Svay Rieng Province.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 11 -

Calling this a maneuver by the U.S. imperialists to provoke enmity between Cambodia and Vietnam, the commentary cites AFP as reporting that "reliable sources" in Phnom Penh had denied that the clash took place.

NCNA STATEMENT DENIES CAMBODIAN EMBASSY ATTACKED

Peking first acknowledges the 11 March disturbances in Cambodia on the 16th with an "authorized" NCNA statement* which says that following the Phnom Penh events "a rumor came from Phnom Penh that Vietnamese nationals in Peking demonstrated in front of the embassy of Cambodia in China and wrecked" it. NCNA adds that on 14 March a press release of the Cambodian "Opposition Cabinet"--presumably the publication LE "CONTRE-GOUVERNMENT" DU SANGKUM REASTR NIYUM--expressed hope that the rumor was fabricated. NCNA pronounces the rumors "complete fabrications" by people with "ulterior motives" and says that Chou En-lai pointed this out to the Cambodian ambassador on the 15th, expressing regret over the Phnom Penh incidents. The Cambodian ambassador, according to NCNA, said that the embassy and its personnel were "perfectly safe." Hanoi briefly reports the NCNA denial in a VNA commentary attributed to Hanoi radio on 18 March. (Sihanouk's message to his mother from Moscow, as reported by AFP on the 18th, said Chou En-lai had expressed to him--through the Cambodian ambassador--China's "concern" over the events in Phnom Penh, adding that "for the moment China maintains its calm over the provocations with which its Phnom Penh embassy is threatened.")

* This is the first authorized NCNA statement since 20 July 1969, when NCNA refuted African charges that the PRC issued stamps featuring "revolutionary leaders and groups" in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There has been no known previous NCNA statement on Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 12 -

LAOS

KOSYGIN REJECTS PRESIDENT'S CALL FOR GENEVA CONSULTATIONS

Kosygin's message to President Nixon rejecting the President's "support of the proposal for consultations between the signatories of the Geneva conference on Laos" was summarized by Radio Moscow late on 15 March but has yet to be publicized in full. The message is responsive to the President's announcement on 6 March that he backed Souvanna Phouma's bid to the Soviet and British Geneva cochairmen--in letters to them on 28 February--for consultations under Article 4 of the 1962 agreement on Laos. Kosygin's letter--also summarized in the press--does not directly acknowledge that the President sent letters of his own to the cochairmen asking their help in restoring the 1962 agreements. Kosygin calls the President's "support" for Souvanna's move "unrealistic in the present situation" when the United States is "expanding armed interference" in Laos and the coalition government "has been paralyzed as a result of the actions of the rightwing forces."

Kosygin's letter gives the first official Soviet support to the NLHX five-point program, stating that "it is necessary to begin the restoration of peace in Laos by consultations between the political forces of the country" and that the NLHX has put forward a "concrete and very realistic five-point program for a settlement." The letter briefly reviews the content of the five points and repeats the demand that the bombing be halted "completely and unconditionally." It goes on to stress the necessity "first and foremost to stop American interference in Laotian affairs" and of "Vientiane not departing from the position of neutrality envisaged by the Geneva agreements."

Kosygin welcomes the "contacts being arranged" between Souvanna and Souphanouvong and expresses the belief that "if American intervention is stopped" the contacts "would make it possible to reduce tension in Laos and create conditions for a political settlement." He declares that the Soviet Government will "continue to make every effort to get hostilities in Laos stopped and conditions created for the development of the country in peace, independence, and neutrality."*

* There is no available communist mention of the 11 March French statement calling for an end to all foreign intervention in Laos and a return to the 1962 Geneva agreement. Rejecting any "false solution," the statement offered French help in reaching a "true" solution "when the time comes."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 13 -

Soviet comment, including an IZVESTIYA article by Matveyev on 12 March and a PRAVDA article by Korionov on the 14th, expresses continuing concern over alleged U.S. escalation in Laos. On the 17th TASS promptly reports that Undersecretary Richardson, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the day before, "made it clear that the United States is not going to end its military operations in Laos" and said "specifically" that the chief executive "does not need Congressional approval to continue bombing raids in Laos." TASS notes that Senator Fulbright made public Secretary Rogers' earlier comment that the United States has no "present" plans for using ground troops in Laos, although this did not mean the Administration would not consider such plans in the future. TASS reports Richardson's qualification of Rogers' statement that Congressional approval of such a move would be sought, noting that he said the Administration would not feel committed to ask Congress.

A later TASS report on the 17th notes briefly that Secretary Rogers, speaking on television that day, reiterated that the United States had no present plans to send ground combat troops to Laos but that this did not rule out the possibility of the President reconsidering his attitude if the situation required. TASS does not, of course, report that Rogers expressed concern over present communist military actions in Laos.

Some Moscow comment attributes to the United States a strategy for spreading aggression throughout and even beyond Indochina. Aleksey Leontyev, for example, in a commentary broadcast in English to South Asia on the 13th, says Washington regards Laos as "an important strategic area in Asia, a kind of gateway to Asia which can be used for the suppression of the national liberation movement in Indochina." He notes in this connection that Laos has common borders with North Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, and "other countries," without naming China. A domestic service broadcast on the 13th points to a coincidence between U.S. attempts to "extend the Vietnamese war to neighboring Laos" with the "intensification of American provocations" against Cambodia--that is, the attacks on the DRV and PRG embassies there.

HANOI CONTINUES PRAISE FOR NLHX PROGRAM, CRITICISM OF NIXON

Hanoi continues its enthusiastic praise for the NLHX five-point program with publicity for a "grand meeting" sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front in Hanoi on the 12th. The Hanoi domestic service on the 13th reports that Tran Huu Duet, Secretary General of the Fatherland Front, voiced the Vietnamese people's "full support" of the five-point program--an "initiative of paramount importance." He referred to the Vietnamese and Laotian people's "mutual aid" and said they have always "stood side by side" in the struggle against the common enemy. Phau Phimphanchan, the director of the NLHX Information Bureau in Hanoi, thanked the Vietnamese

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 14 -

for their support, saying that the Vietnamese people are "not only close neighbors but also trustworthy comrades in arms." He added that "our long-tested militant solidarity and fraternal kith-and-kin relations" have been further consolidated through struggles against the French and the Americans.

Both speakers at the meeting repeated the demand in the 6 March NLHX statement that "to create conditions for the parties concerned in Laos to meet" the United States must stop all acts of intervention and aggression, "first and foremost stop escalating the war and bombing Laotian territory without posing any condition whatsoever."

A 16 March NHAN DAN commentary carries forward Hanoi's criticism of President Nixon's 6 March statement, saying that "the situation in Laos is utterly grave and varies completely from Nixon's allegations." It takes issue with the President's remarks to the effect that the United States has "only over 1,000 advisers and military men of various kinds" in Laos, that the United States has no combat troops in Laos, and that no American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations. After enumerating other alleged U.S. moves to escalate the war in Laos--including intensified bombing--the commentary labels President Nixon's statement that the United States wants to see a return to the Geneva agreements, leaving the Laotian people to settle their own differences in a peaceful manner, a "deceitful allegation" that has been unmasked by realities.

Speaking at the 12 March session of the Paris talks on Vietnam, DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy called the President's statement an "open admission," although only a partial one, of the fact that the United States has for years "directly taken part" in the war in Laos. He cited the 6 March NLHX statement and the 9 March DRV Government statement in tracing the origin of the present tension in Laos to U.S. escalation, and he repeated the demand that the United States "first of all" stop escalating the war and "completely and unconditionally put an end" to the bombing so that the parties concerned can settle the internal affairs of Laos themselves.

PRG COMMENT Following customary practice, the PRG echoed Hanoi's support for the NLHX with official statements of its own. A PRG Government statement dated 11 March, carried by LPA on the 13th, supports the NLHX five-point program. (The PRG Foreign Ministry had similarly endorsed the 20 February NLHX Central Committee statement on U.S. B-52 bombings in the Plain of Jars.) Further support for the NLHX program is expressed in an LPA editorial, publicized on 13 March, which also criticizes President Nixon's 6 March statement for advancing the "piratical argument" that the aim of U.S. bombings in Laos is to preserve

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 15 -

U.S. lives in South Vietnam. The military victories in the Plain of Jars are applauded in two messages on 8 March, one from Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat to Prince Souphanouvong and the other from the PLAF Command to the LPLA High Command, both carried by Liberation Radio on 14 March.

PATHET LAO SCORES U.S. DEMAND FOR DRV TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Publicity for the five-point NLHX program and criticism of the President's 6 March statement continues in Pathet Lao media, with a 15 March Pathet Lao radio commentary charging the President with setting conditions for a Laos settlement. The commentary says the President "arrogantly demanded that the so-called North Vietnamese troops be pulled out of Laos," making the withdrawal "a condition for a meeting between all sides concerned with the Laos problem." It adds that the U.S. State Department has "clearly stated that Washington regards the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Laos as its basic condition in settling the Laos question," and it cites AFP as reporting on 12 March that Souvanna Phouma said "U.S. bombing raids would end only when the North Vietnamese troops are withdrawn." The Pathet Lao commentary also scores RLG General Kouprasith Abhay for playing the "farce" of displaying DRV prisoners at a Vientiane press conference on the 12th.

Communist media are not known to have mentioned the press interview granted by Soth Pethrasi, the NLHX representative in Vientiane, in which--as reported by Western sources--he said that a "total and unconditional American bombing halt" was a "precondition" for talks between the Laotian parties. IZVESTIYA on 14 March does report, citing AFP, that Pethrasi said that "as soon as the raids on Laos cease the NLHX will be ready to begin talks with American representatives on freeing the U.S. pilots taken prisoner in Laos." A panelist in the 15 March Moscow domestic service roundtable discussion takes similar note of Pethrasi's remark.

PATHET LAO EMISSARY The Pathet Lao radio reported on 16 March that Prince Souvanouvong's emissary--whose appointment had been announced by the radio on the 10th--had "left the liberated area for Vientiane" on the 16th to carry messages to Souvanna Phouma and the King. On the 18th Hanoi's domestic service reported his arrival in the DRV capital the preceding day.

PEKING SCORES ALLEGED U.S. COMBAT PRESENCE IN LAOS

Peking comment continues to avoid bringing up the idea of a peaceful settlement in Laos, focusing on charges of U.S. aggression. An NCNA commentary on 13 March broaches the issue of Chinese security in noting that American airmen fly support missions in "liberated areas" of Laos and in "areas close to the borders of China and the DRV." This

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 16 -

commentary cites the "U.S. press" as divulging that the United States has been sending in "large numbers of advisers" for a "long time" and that "recently" it sent in "ground forces" in civilian guise to take "direct part" in attacks. NCNA also asserts that U.S. troops stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand have repeatedly crossed Laotian borders to carry out combat missions, after which some return to their bases and others remain in Laos. NCNA does not acknowledge that such charges were made by Senator Cranston on 9 March.

Other NCNA commentaries point to alleged activities of the CIA in Laos, citing the Western press. NCNA says such activities expose President Nixon's "lies" about "reducing U.S. involvement" in Laos. A "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield article" by a PLA man, carried by NCNA in Chinese on 12 March, once again labels as a "complete lie" President Nixon's 6 March statement that U.S. involvement in Laos is designed "to protect American lives and to create conditions for restoring peace throughout the Indochinese peninsula."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 17 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW DEFENDS POSITION OF SOVIET JEWS, ASSAILS ZIONISM

Soviet comment on the Middle East has markedly diminished, from 14 percent of total comment to nine percent in the week ending 15 March. More than half this material consists of anti-Zionist propaganda, along with publicity for statements by Soviet Jews denouncing "anti-Soviet slander" by Israel and professing support for the Soviet policy of seeking a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The protest campaign as such has virtually disappeared from the propaganda--the last available report of protest meetings came from TASS on the 12th--and material on the Middle East has tended to lose its place of prominence in TASS press reviews in the last few days. As the third subject in the review on the 18th, however, TASS does say the papers continue to publish letters from Soviet people "expressing their indignation" at Israeli behavior.

ANTI-ZIONIST CAMPAIGN The anti-Zionist drum-beating goes into the fourth week, sustained at a high volume; the material is broadcast to a wide range of foreign audiences, so far excluding apparently only the Yugoslavs. The propaganda stresses standard themes of the "racist" and anticommunist nature of Zionism and its "class essence" which "meets the interests of the bourgeoisie and not the people." Commentaries cite Lenin on the question of anti-Semitism and again hail the efforts of working Jews in Israel and other countries, at the same time praising the "courageous" Israeli Communist Party for demanding cessation of the "aggression unleashed by the Zionists" in the Middle East. Propagandists also dwell on the common topic of "U.S. imperialist support" for Zionism, a 10 March TRUD article warning of the dangers of the "triple alliance" of "U.S. imperialism, Israeli militarism, and international Zionism."

Occasional broadcast attention to Zionism in the past year has not approached this level of publicity, and Moscow's motives in extending the present campaign at this volume are unclear. The Zionist aspect, along with protests by Soviet Jews, entered Moscow's broad campaign against Israeli "aggression" some four days after the first publicity, on 20 February, for protest meetings in the USSR. The protest campaign seemed to peak on 2 March--a "day of world protest against bombing of civilians," according to a 21 February announcement in Cairo by the secretary general of the World Peace Council. The 2 March protest day might have been timed to coincide with the deadline for the U.S. decision on further deliveries of aircraft to Israel; President Nixon had said at his 30 January press conference that a decision would be made within the next 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 18 -

The theory that the Soviet protest campaign presaged an announcement of some "important Soviet decision" had been aired by Cairo AL-AHRAM editor Haykal in a Cairo television interview on 10 March--when the campaign of protest meetings was already abating. Speaking about Soviet arming of the Arabs during the interview, Haykal said that after the 1967 defeat the USSR "established a direct air bridge with us" and "did not withhold assistance." He seemed to indicate, however, that the Soviets had not agreed to all UAR equipment requests, remarking that "it gave us all that was requested of it, or at least all that was agreed upon."

Background: Zionism received broadcast attention last May in a series of Moscow broadcasts in Arabic based on a book by Ivanov, "Beware of Zionism." And in December last year anti-Zionist articles by Plotkin in the 12 December PRAVDA and by Berenshteyn and Fridel in the 14 December IZVESTIYA were publicized in foreign-language broadcasts. The PRAVDA article argued that the "Jewish question" was solved in the USSR by the October Revolution and claimed that anti-Semitism was "profoundly alien to the Soviet people."

The IZVESTIYA article, responding to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's "initiation of the latest anti-Soviet subversion" in a "provocative speech" to the new Knesset, insisted that charges of anti-Semitism in the USSR were "blatant fabrications." IZVESTIYA's comments on the question of emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel have not reappeared in current anti-Zionist propaganda: the paper noted that the Knesset had adopted a resolution stating that the Soviet Union should allow those who desire to emigrate to Israel to do so. The paper asserted that "in principle Soviet law resolves with the greatest democracy the question of those who wish to emigrate," and it added:

When certain Soviet Jews (they were mainly elderly people) have desired to leave the USSR and join their relatives abroad, including those in Israel, they have received and are receiving such an opportunity. If the granting of such an opportunity in relation to Israel has been complicated in the last two and a half years, none other than Israel is to blame for this; because of its aggression against the Arab countries the USSR has broken off diplomatic relations with it.

SOVIET JEWS Moscow acknowledged a statement by pro-Zionist Soviet Jews reported by Western correspondents, IZVESTIYA on the 12th complaining of the correspondents' circulation of "an anonymous letter, which they called 'a statement by a group of Moscow Jews' who are ready, the 'statement' says," to set off for Israel. Claiming that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 19 -

the style of "this 'document'" is "remarkably similar to the slanderous writings" by Western specialists in "ideological diversion and slander," IZVESTIYA cautioned the correspondents that they are not accredited to the USSR as representatives of international Zionism, "and this must be remembered."

Moscow implicitly responded on the 12th to Western press reports from London on the same day that an appeal had been received from Jews in Riga, Latvia, to be allowed to emigrate to Israel. The domestic service reported on the 12th that Latvian Jews at a press conference in Riga protested "criminal actions" of the Israeli "extremists" and "resolutely rebuked the Israeli leaders who try to falsify Soviet policy on the nationality question." The Riga Jews' statement continued to get propaganda attention, with TASS reporting the press conference on the 13th and PRAVDA the following day publishing a TASS report of the statement.

Statements by Ukrainian Jews are also played up in the propaganda, and on the 18th TASS reports a letter by a group of Soviet Jewish physicians "demanding an end to Israeli aggression." Moscow at the same time responds to Israeli statements in the United Nations regarding treatment of Jews in the USSR. TASS reported on the 16th that the Soviet mission at the United Nations sent a letter to the Security Council president "strongly protesting" the circulation as an official Security Council document of a statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban containing "pronouncements of a clearly slanderous character on questions which are fully and completely within the internal competence of the USSR."

USSR SPECULATES ON PHANTOM DECISION, U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Soviet propaganda continues to bring up the impending decision on further U.S. aircraft deliveries to Israel. Noting American press speculation on the question, Mayevskiy in the 12 March PRAVDA says one gets the impression that U.S. officials are reviewing American policy in the Near East and that "this is fraught with even greater interference in the affairs of this region under cover of an anti-Soviet hubbub." Commenting on articles by columnists Reston and Alsop and remarks by Eugene Rostow, Mayevskiy says Reston's and Rostow's remarks had "something suspiciously in common" with Alsop's "appeals for open U.S. military intervention in support of Israel," and he wonders if there are not some people in Washington "thinking about a 'Near East Vietnam'" to save the U.S. oil profits in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 20 -

RED STAR on the 15th, pointing to Israeli impatience over the delaying of the U.S. decision "beyond the promised period," says the accumulation of weapons and the creation of a military industry have always been the foremost concern of "Israeli Zionist leaders," whose policy is one of force. Only the help of "imperialist powers" in supplying and producing arms, and the constant training and retraining of military cadres explain Israel's military supremacy over the Arabs, RED STAR says, dismissing the "myth" of "special qualities" of the Israeli army and unusual abilities of its commanders. Acknowledging Israeli air superiority "for the present," RED STAR cites Nasir's remarks on a UAR pilot shortage in a LE MONDE interview. The UAR training program "after some time" will undoubtedly alter the present air balance, the paper says, adding that Tel Aviv, aware of this, is seeking to enlist in the Israeli forces "a still greater number of military specialists--mercenaries from Western countries--and above all pilots."

CHARGES OF DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT

An article in IZVESTIYA on the 15th by Svetlov charges that the United States is not only supplying arms but is "closing its eyes to the direct participation by American citizens" in Israel's "aggression." Recalling the "U.S. Government decision" to "permit Americans to serve in the Israeli armed forces without losing their citizenship," Svetlov asserts that Israel is recruiting U.S. soldiers in West Germany on short-term contracts for service in Israel, "with the private knowledge of the American military authorities." TASS on the 17th picks up a Cairo AL-AHRAM report that 80 U.S. pilots of Jewish nationality have been "invited to Israel to pilot Phantom planes." In the 4 March PRAVDA Glukhov had said it was common knowledge that the supply of Phantoms to Israel began in September 1969 and that "a group of pilots, who retained their American citizenship, left the United States for Israel."

The only monitored reference to Soviet volunteers comes from an Arab source. The Damascus office of the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY reported on the 15th that Mufti of Central Asia and Soviet Kazakhstan Babakhanov, visiting in Jordan, said that Soviet Moslem youth are reporting to the mosques to register their names "as volunteers in the ranks of the strugglers to save al-Aqsa Mosque and the occupied lands in Palestine."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 21 -

STRATEGIC ARMS

SOVIET PRESS SUSTAINS ATTACK ON U.S. STAND ON ARMS, SALT

A spate of central press articles sustains the Soviet propaganda attack on U.S. weapons programs and the U.S. approach to next month's strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in the wake of the authoritative 7 March PRAVDA Observer article which underscored Soviet concern over U.S. defense policy. Most notably, an article in the 14 March IZVESTIYA by chief editor L. Tolkunov is on balance more negative than the PRAVDA Observer article, though it concludes that there is still hope for braking the arms race. Tolkunov says it is obvious that the strategic arms talks must not be used as a "screen to conceal a stepped-up arms race" and that Washington must realize this "while there is still time and the opportunity has not been lost." An International Review article by V. Korionov in the 15 March PRAVDA echoes the Observer commentary in reaffirming the USSR's "seriousness" toward the impending Vienna talks and in calling "a serious, honest approach" an indispensable condition for the success of the negotiations.

The Tolkunov article, which sums up the writer's impressions during a recent visit to the United States, deplores the decision to move forward with plans for the Safeguard ABM system, particularly its timing. Tolkunov acknowledges that Secretary Rogers and other high U.S. officials assured him that the United States does not wish to deceive the USSR in the Vienna phase of SALT and "aspires to talks on a serious, dispassionate basis and with consideration of objective reality." He also notes that these officials said the decision related only to budgetary questions and "cannot have an effect on the course" of SALT. But "other American figures," Tolkunov says, view the decision as "evidence of a strengthening of those military and political circles which do not want to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union." He points to a stepup in activities of those interested in a new spiral of the arms race--"consciously planned actions calculated to thwart possible agreement," directed by "the same old military-industrial complex . . . screaming about the Soviet threat." And he cites Senator Mansfield for the statement that "the extension of the ABM system may jeopardize" SALT.

CONCEPT OF
"SUFFICIENCY"

In assailing the activities of the military-industrial complex, Tolkunov appears to reverse an earlier positive Soviet propaganda assessment of President Nixon's choice of the phrase "nuclear sufficiency." Comment following the President's 27 January 1969 press conference had welcomed his use of this word in place of nuclear "superiority," a foreign-language broadcast the day after the press conference noting the belief of "some observers" that this "fundamental change" in phraseology reflected a "more realistic"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 22 -

approach to questions of foreign policy. A PRAVDA article on 29 January 1969, noting the President's use of "sufficiency," said he explained that the notion of superiority "has a detrimental effect and gives an impetus to a new ambitious arms race." Tolkunov now comments that "the verbosity of such terminology [sufficiency] well suits its authors." He remarks that sufficiency "sounds sensible and nonaggressive" while leaving "total room for maneuver," since "in absolute terms the level of 'sufficiency' is in no way defined or restricted: it can be anything, including an unrestrained arms race." Naming Secretary Laird as the chief spokesman of those advocating nuclear "supremacy," Tolkunov says that there are in fact no contradictions between them and the "sufficiency" spokesmen and that the two groups "closed their ranks" when the Administration dragged the Safeguard bill through Congress."

DECISION The PRAVDA Observer article had not mentioned MIRV's and
ON MIRV'S Tolkunov mentions them only briefly, noting that a
 report of the Stockholm International Peace Institute
sees SALT "threatened" by the U.S. decision to develop MIRV's. But
IZVESTIYA articles on 12 and 18 March and a RED STAR article on the
14th are pegged to the 11 March announcement by Air Force Secretary
Seamans that the United States had decided to proceed with deployment
of the weapons system as early as June 1970. The RED STAR article,
by Berezin, charges that during the last few months the Pentagon has
tried to "put spokes in the wheels of the 'Helsinki-Vienna' express"
and that the MIRV decision represents one such spoke. Noting expressions
of concern in the foreign press that the decision endangers SALT,
the author concludes on his own authority that it poses "a serious
threat" to the talks and that it has been taken "for the benefit of,
and under pressure from, America's powerful military-industrial
complex."

The MIRV decision had been reported promptly by Radio Moscow on the
11th and treated in a foreign-language commentary by Vavilov the
following day. TASS on the 12th reported at some length on Congressional
opposition to MIRV deployment, including Senator Percy's suggestion that
the United States "freeze immediately" the production of offensive and
defensive strategic missiles and advance such a proposal at SALT.
Reporting Secretary Rogers' 17 March remarks on television, TASS says
he defended the Administration's plans to begin deployment of MIRV's
and "maintained that these plans would not affect" the Vienna talks.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 23 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

TASS STATEMENT DENIES SOVIETS PREPARING ATTACK ON CHINA

Issuing a TASS statement on 14 March denying that the Soviet Union is undertaking military measures along the Sino-Soviet border in preparation for an attack on China, Moscow has again sought to counter Western speculation over Soviet intentions and has reaffirmed a resolve to improve Sino-Soviet relations through the Peking talks. In taking exception to Western "insinuations" regarding Soviet actions on the border, the TASS statement seems designed to offset an impression that Moscow is seeking to exert military and psychological pressure on the Chinese. The statement may be intended not only for the propaganda record--in effect rebutting leaked Chinese charges of Soviet military pressure on the border--but also to bolster those elements in Peking favorable to the negotiations and subject to pressures from hardline elements.

Peking is silent on the border dispute and has initiated no new attacks on the Soviets, although the Chinese keep the ideological conflict alive through the proxy of "Iranian revolutionaries" who have attacked Brezhnev and Kosygin by name.

TASS STATEMENT The "authorized" TASS statement of 14 March,* published in the central press and widely broadcast, dismisses Western reports of "major military actions" by the Soviets on the border with China as anticommunist propaganda inventions designed to hamper the Peking talks and to increase tension in Sino-Soviet relations. According to the statement, released as the "Dvina" exercises in Belorussia were concluding, the Soviet armed forces "are on their routine duty, raising their combat efficiency under their usual plans and programs and strengthening the defenses of the Soviet state throughout its territory." The statement complains that the Western reports--attributed to "the bourgeois press and the ruling circles of certain imperialist states"--are taken up by Chinese propaganda in the current war preparedness campaign.

* There have been TASS statements in recent months on a variety of subjects, though not on Sino-Soviet relations. The last such statement involving China was a 14 July 1966 statement denouncing Western reports of Soviet-U.S. collusion on Vietnam as being designed for use by anti-Soviet elements in Peking.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 24 -

Moscow has publicized the backing of its allies for the TASS statement in a 14 March TASS report on publicity for it in the press of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The East German and Romanian press reported the statement on the 15th.

OTHER SOVIET COMMENT A KOMMUNIST article on new party rules adopted by the CCP's ninth congress, available in a TASS review of 12 March, accuses "the present leaders of the CCP" of substituting "Maoism for Marxism-Leninism" and of "actually moving to create a fundamentally new political organization, an organization based in its structure and activities on personality cult, extreme centralism, militarization, and abandonment of democracy within the party. For its aims and tasks this is a nationalistic, chauvinist organization with a pronounced anti-Soviet slant."

The last KOMMUNIST article devoted to China, charging the "Maoists" with an adventurist policy toward the national liberation movement, appeared in issue No. 12, signed to press 12 August 1969. Suslov's article on Leninism in KOMMUNIST No. 15, signed to press 10 October 1969, made a passing reference to concern within the world communist movement over "the adventurist, chauvinist policy of the present leaders of the CCP."

In the first direct attack on Peking to be registered in a bilateral document since the opening of the Peking talks, a joint communique issued on a CPSU delegation's visit to Finland--carried by PRAVDA on 11 March--says the CPSU and the Finnish CP call for the preservation of international communist unity "through a decisive rebuff to anti-Leninist ideology and practice of Maoism."

NEW TIMES (No. 11, dated 12 March), commenting on Chinese foreign policy, observes that the Chinese are attempting to divert attention from U.S. hostility and to transfer the Chinese people's indignation to the Soviet Union. And LITERARY GAZETTE on 11 March reprints a wide-ranging Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU article on the Chinese domestic issues of party restoration and internal political struggles, opposition to resettlement and rustication, and war preparations and anti-Sovietism.

A passage on China in a PRAVDA article on 7 March by Col. S. Lukonin--entitled "V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland"--has overtones that may be construed as directed at impatient hardline elements in the Soviet military itching for a crack at the Chinese. After stating that the "core" of Lenin's doctrine on the defense of the socialist fatherland lies in party leadership over military affairs, the article says Lenin condemned attempts "by the army or individual military organs" to break away from party control, and it refers to the situation in China today as an illustration of the violation of this doctrine. The reference to China may have been intended not only--

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 25 -

perhaps not even mainly--as a polemical slap at Peking but also as a subtle way of raising the question of party control over those in the military advocating more forceful measures against the Chinese.

Brezhnev has associated his authority as party chief with counsels of moderation toward China, as in his reference to Soviet "presence of mind and restraint" in a conciliatory speech on 27 October last year endorsing the opening of the Peking talks a week earlier. In an article in the August issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM at a time of severe Sino-Soviet tensions, Brezhnev had pointedly asserted that the Soviets would not be provoked into rash acts. The passage in the PRAVDA article--written by a colonel with a background as a political officer--may have been intended as a warning to the military to stay within bounds prescribed by the Brezhnev leadership in dealing with China.

PEKING Peking remains silent on the border dispute. PRC media have not reported the 6 March editorial in the Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT charging that Moscow is seeking to form integrated Warsaw Pact units which would be sent to the Sino-Soviet border for use against China. Consistent with recent Chinese practice, in which there have been occasional polemical sallies against the Soviets but no sustained polemical campaign, Peking has not initiated an anti-Soviet attack since the 7 March NCNA denunciation of the recently concluded Soviet-U.S. cultural exchange agreement. The Chinese have, however, flaunted their ideological rivalry with Moscow by disseminating an article attributed to "Iranian revolutionaries" which recalls the past decade's upheavals in the world communist movement. As summarized by NCNA on the 15th, the article mocks at Khrushchev and "his successor Brezhnev-Kosygin clique" and likens "Soviet social imperialism" to traditional imperialism. There is no mention of current Sino-Soviet troubles.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 26 -

USSR AND EAST EUROPE

Moscow Assails "Selfish" Nationalism, Calls for Integration

Intensifying Soviet propaganda pressure on Romania is apparent in a series of commentaries by Semen Vladimirov broadcast by Radio Moscow predominantly to Romanian audiences from 10 to 15 March--dates coincident with the Soviet armed forces' "Dvina" maneuvers in Belorussia.* Vladimirov, described by Radio Moscow as "an international affairs expert," comes down hard on the evils of "selfish nationalism" and cites the need for strengthened political and economic "integration" in the socialist bloc to meet an ever-rising "imperialist threat." He also stresses repeatedly that the test of socialist credentials is a country's attitude toward the USSR and, by implication, its foreign policies.

Vladimirov's comments are notable for blatant reminders that when the socialist countries determined that socialism was in danger in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, they were "obliged" to take joint action to set things right. They are also notable for a pointed reference to the lasting historical importance of the Warsaw letter of 1968 that preceded the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The Vladimirov talks fit with a sharpening Soviet propaganda line on the need to strengthen "collective" defense measures--a trend which may be related to Moscow's efforts to secure greater support from its East European allies in the conflict with the PRC. Romania's neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute and its continuing opposition to Soviet integrationist pressures appear to be the principal targets of Vladimirov's attack on "deviations" from proletarian internationalism.

The first in the series of talks, broadcast on the 10th, acknowledges that "correct relations between the socialist countries are not a simple matter" and points out that "the problem is aggravated by the fact that among the governing party ranks in a number of socialist countries there are often attitudes and policies which represent a deviation from Marxism-Leninism and from socialist internationalism."

* The maneuvers, discussed in the second article in this section of the TRENDS, drew exceptional propaganda fanfare and carried overtones of warning to the Yugoslavs, Romanians, and Albanians, who were the targets of the largest amount of comment for European listeners. Vladimirov's commentaries were beamed to Romanian audiences in a total of 10 broadcasts. There were seven broadcasts of parts of the series to Poland, six to Albania, five to Hungary, and two to Bulgaria.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 27 -

The countries are unidentified, but the reference to "governing party ranks" goes beyond Moscow's usual, less pointed allusions to "elements" or "those" who hold offending viewpoints. Elsewhere in the same commentary Vladimirov uses the PRC and pre-August 1968 Czechoslovakia as illustrations of the "lessons" that can be drawn on the need to combat both left and right revisionism. But throughout the talks, he makes it clear that his chief target countries are in Eastern Europe.

One of Vladimirov's central themes is the obstacle nationalism poses to building world socialism. Declaring in the 10 March talk that to be a true internationalist one has "to think not only of one's own nation," he charges that the West is trying "to use the remnants of nationalism in the socialist countries, the existence of narrow local interests, of national selfishness, the rush of certain groups or leaders for transitory advantages to the detriment of the basic interests of world socialism and the international workers movement."

Vladimirov goes on to recall that "when the working class was threatened" in the GDR, in Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia, the socialist countries were "called upon to give the enemy a counterblow through joint action." Recalling the 1968 Warsaw letter, he says that "though the years will pass and the causes which gave rise to the nuances in the wording of this document will be forgotten, the letter itself remains a historical event, a record of collective communist thinking which found an upsurge at the time of real serious danger to socialism." He echoes a theme in the hardline 7 March Lukonin article in PRAVDA on "Defense of the Socialist Fatherland" when he states flatly that "the attitude toward the USSR has become the touchstone of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, to the cause of socialist internationalism."

In talks broadcast on the 12th and the 15th, Vladimirov argues the need for closer bloc economic and political ties based on the analogy of the experience of the Soviet republics. During the early stages of socialism in the USSR, he says, the republics realized the need to set up "a uniform economy of the entire land and understood the need for military alliances" and "the unification of their forces." He recalls that at the time Lenin had warned against "all attempts to violate this unification as an absolutely inadmissible phenomenon, as a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism." If the republics had not set up their political and economic alliances, Vladimirov says, socialism would have been extinguished. He adds that "this experience must be borne in mind when determining the plans for building the socialist community of nations in the new international situation."

In his final talk on the 15th Vladimirov points to the socialist community's "concern with strengthening their integration from the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 28 -

political and economic point of view." He dismisses allegations by "bourgeois and revisionist propagandists" that this would in any way limit the sovereignty of the member states. Returning to the analogy of the Soviet experience, he concludes: "If we think for a moment of the essence of the social transformation brought by socialism to the USSR, we can then understand that socialism does not at all mean the disappearance of nations but their true flourishing and multilateral development. This development is taking place not on the ground of bourgeois nationalism and international friction, but on the basis of socialism and internationalism, on the basis of friendship and fraternity between socialist countries. This situation prepares the conditions for the future fusion of nations under the conditions of world communism."

SOVIET MANEUVERS IMPLY WARNING TO DISSIDENT COMMUNIST STATES

Unprecedented propaganda fanfare for the Soviet armed forces' "Dvina" maneuvers in Belorussia from 10 to 15 March, pitting victorious "Northern" forces over a "Southern" enemy, carries overtones of a warning to the recalcitrant southern European states--Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. In a speech at a military review in Minsk at the end of the maneuvers, Defense Minister Grechko* used language reminiscent of Soviet statements at the time of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, when the Warsaw Five moved in to defend "the gains of socialism" which Dubcek had failed to protect. Grechko declared in Minsk that the Soviet armed forces "will always vigilantly guard the great gains of socialism and will honorably fulfill their patriotic and internationalist duty."

Radio Moscow devoted a sizable six percent of its total comment during the week ending 15 March to the "Dvina" maneuvers, in contrast to less than one percent for the last previous Soviet troop exercise of comparable scale--the "Dnepr" maneuvers of September-October 1967. Soviet domestic media carried the most comment; foreign beaming was heaviest in Mandarin, with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania the main audience targets in Europe.

As in the case of the Warsaw Pact "Oder-Neisse" exercises in Poland last September, an implicit lesson is hammered home for southern

* Brezhnev was present on the platform with Grechko, having arrived in Minsk on the 13th amid a spate of Western conjectures regarding a serious challenge to his and Kosygin's leadership by a Suslov-led faction in the CPSU Politburo. Soviet media report only that Brezhnev "spoke" during an analysis of the exercises on the 14th and at a Belorussian Communist Party reception for the participants on the 15th, without indicating the contents of either speech; they note that he left for Moscow later that day after talks with Belorussian party leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 29 -

European communist dissidents through propaganda stress on the victories of the "Northern" forces in the "Dvina" maneuvers over the "Southern" or "enemy" forces. Permeated with excitement and awe at the prowess of the personnel and power of the weaponry, Soviet media's battle reports praise "the precision bombing and missile launching of the 'Northern' side." The Northern commander "decided to utilize nuclear weapons" (simulated) when other means failed to repulse an "enemy" attack, according to a report carried in TRUD on the 13th.

Reflecting the Warsaw Pact organizational changes decided on at Budapest in March 1969, TASS says the exercises and final review were watched by Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy and "representatives of the staff of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries" as well as military attaches of these countries--thus begging the question of whether or not a Romanian representative was present. Moscow had not so directly related the 1967 "Dnepr" maneuvers to the Warsaw Pact; on that occasion it listed high-ranking defense officials in attendance from a broad spectrum of communist countries, including Romania and Yugoslavia.

The opening of the "Dvina" maneuvers was reported by press organs of most of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carrying subsequent daily reports accompanied by pictures. The exercises so far have been ignored by the media of Albania and Romania. The Bucharest SCINTEIA on the 11th--the day after the maneuvers started--carried a Moscow-dated report of a CEMA electric power meeting in the Soviet capital, listing the participating countries including Romania and Yugoslavia.

A press review broadcast by Radio Belgrade in Russian to the USSR on 13 March quotes the Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA as commenting that "such maneuvers, motivated by bloc policy, are a negative counteraction to the processes of lessening tension and promoting cooperation," comparing the "Dvina" maneuvers to "the recently held maneuvers of NATO forces in Norway under the name of 'Arctic Express.'" The Yugoslav army paper goes on to stress the "serious anxiety" evoked by "all this," adding that "maneuvers of such a character . . . have nothing in common with the legitimate right of every independent country" to hold exercises "for the sole purpose of strengthening its defense forces and defending its own independence, self-dependence, and freedom."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 30 -

WEST GERMANY

GDR DEMANDS BRANDT STATE VIEWS ON DRAFT TREATY AT ERFURT

East German media, claiming for the GDR all the credit for the summit meeting between FRG Chancellor Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph to be held 19 March at Erfurt, East Germany, stress pervasively that the GDR's draft treaty for establishing relations between the two states is the only agenda topic and that Brandt "must" at last take a public position on it. Daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorials emphasize the "conciliatory" and "reasonable" attitude of the GDR and its readiness for negotiations, while reiterating that the draft treaty is the sine qua non for establishing GDR-FRG relations.

Soviet media rely largely on East German sources for extensive reports on the summit agreement. Moscow also publicizes GDR comment and emphasizes the "decisive" nature of the impending meeting in low-volume, restrained comment of its own. Soviet media have maintained silence on the interrupted talks in Moscow between FRG negotiator Bahr and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Polish media report that West German and Polish trade negotiators agreed on a 1970 trade protocol on 16 March after failing to settle "certain essential problems" of a long-term Polish-FRG trade accord.

GDR MEDIA ON SUMMIT The initial East Berlin radio announcement late on 12 March concerning the agreement on an Erfurt summit meeting pointed out that Erfurt had been proposed by the GDR. Subsequent East German comment repeatedly emphasizes that the agreement resulted solely from the GDR's initiative and was achieved despite the "dogmatic" attitude of Bonn, which "until the last moment" had "categorically maintained, with provocative intent," its insistence on a Brandt visit to West Berlin in conjunction with an East Berlin summit.

GDR commentators state repeatedly that the GDR expects to discuss solely its draft treaty, submitted last December by Ulbricht. For example, commentator Van Schnitzler declares on the 12th: "On the negotiating table at Erfurt is nothing else but the GDR draft for a treaty between Bonn and Berlin on the establishment of normal relations on the basis of international law--no more and no less." He adds that at Erfurt "the Brandt government will have a chance to prove itself and to make the Federal Republic honest at long last." A 13 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND comment, tracing GDR efforts in past years to establish relations with the FRG, views the summit agreement as evidence of "the serious readiness of the GDR to negotiate" and the "great spirit of accommodation" the GDR has shown. On the 14th the same paper calls the GDR's "considerable concession" on the summit site an expression of "genuine willingness" to negotiate, while questioning whether the Brandt government is of the same mind. This and other NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentaries and editorials through

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 31 -

the 17th contrast the GDR's "reasonable" and "realistic" viewpoint with the attitude of "revanchist" rightwing opponents of detente in the FRG, noting at the same time that there are also many "reasonable" people in Brandt's own SPD who "urge" him to recognize the GDR. On the 16th the paper calls on Brandt to seize the "genuine and very concrete chance" to abandon past "disastrous, revanchist" policies and begin a "peaceful coexistence" policy with the GDR.

A tone of ultimatum is injected into NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's 17 March editorial. After berating Brandt for failing to comment publicly on the GDR draft treaty submitted three months ago, the editorial says "the time to make up his mind will end for Herr Brandt on Thursday," and Brandt can "no longer delay" a statement on the draft.

Evidence that the GDR has not closed off its options and anticipates further meetings after Erfurt is provided, however, in an 18 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary and an Ulbricht interview with a French agency released in East German media late on the 17th. While the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary reaffirms that the Erfurt summit must discuss the GDR's draft treaty, it appears couched in more moderate terms than earlier propaganda; it appeals to Bonn to renounce subordination to U.S. global strategy and assume "an independent policy of realism and commonsense," and it concludes that if Bonn seizes the present chance to start anew, "the opportunity exists for continuing negotiations through the Erfurt talks." Commenting on the Erfurt talks in the French interview, Ulbricht says: "We can only wish success to these talks so that they may be the starting point for further talks on a treaty of mutual relations of a nondiscriminatory nature on the basis of international law."

QUESTION OF RECOGNITION An East German effort to equate Chancellor Brandt's appearance at Erfurt with implied FRG recognition of the GDR is evident in the presentation of details on summit arrangements by Gerhard Schuessler, deputy head of the GDR Council of Ministers office, as reported on the 13th by ADN and on GDR television. Schuessler stressed that Brandt and his delegation would be met at the Erfurt station by Stoph and the GDR delegation "in the manner corresponding to international usage when there is a meeting of the heads of government of sovereign states" and that throughout the visit the Brandt delegation "will be treated in the GDR in accordance with international protocol procedure," as befits a meeting of heads of "two independent sovereign states."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
18 MARCH 1970

- 32 -

SOVIET VIEW OF SUMMIT Soviet comment stresses that the Erfurt meeting will be a "decisive" test for the Brandt government. Moscow commentator Zakharov tells German listeners on the 13th that "the declarations of the politicians on the Rhine" that they support establishing relations with the GDR "on the basis of equal rights and without discrimination" will be subjected to "a decisive trial" at Erfurt. Zakharov adds that "the maneuvers of Bonn diplomacy" in the preparatory talks in Berlin "prove" that Bonn must study international law before the Erfurt confrontation if it really wants "clearcut relations under international law" with the GDR.

Remarking that "extreme rightwing forces" in the FRG still oppose the summit meeting and any effort to reach agreement with the GDR, a Moscow domestic service commentator suggests in a roundtable discussion on the 15th that Bonn must "adopt a realistic position if it wants to see serious progress" in establishing GDR-FRG relations "based on peaceful coexistence." Such relations, he adds--in a veiled reference to FRG negotiations with the USSR and Poland--"play a major role in the matter of achieving detente" and a stable European peace. TASS correspondent Borisov also acknowledges on the 13th that FRG spokesmen expressed satisfaction with the Erfurt site agreement and that Brandt himself expressed hope for reasonable results from the summit talks, and he reports briefly Foreign Minister Scheel's expression of hope that the Erfurt meeting will be the "first step toward improvement" in FRG-GDR relations.

OTHER VIEWS OF SUMMIT PROSPECTS Pre-summit comments by Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian media uniformly express the view that the GDR-FRG negotiations will be difficult and long but that the ultimate result of these and anticipated future talks will be critical in determining whether a real East-West detente can be achieved in Europe. Hungarian commentators offer the most favorable appraisal of West German intentions, MAGYAR HIRLAP commenting on the 14th, according to MTI, that the SPD-FDP government "has taken the possibilities [for detente] more seriously than its predecessors and has made use of them." Polish commentators stress the importance of FRG agreement to establish normal relations with the GDR, based on international law. PAP commentator Guz writes on the 13th that the Erfurt talks will become "probably the most important criterion" by which to judge whether the Brandt government "is ready to recognize the European realities or whether it will continue to adjust itself to them only halfway."

Czechoslovak commentators generally offer more pessimistic views on Erfurt. A RUDE PRAVO comment reported on the 18th by CTK, for example, insists that "Brandt is not interested in the international recognition of the GDR" because it would force him to "give up attempts to influence and undermine the socialist order in the GDR." FRG "soundings" in talks with the socialist countries are merely a "fig leaf" to hide traditional West German revanchist aims, RUDE PRAVO argues.

CONFIDENTIAL